Network models of route choice by Heydecker, BG
Network Models of Route Choice
Benjamin G. Heydecker CMath FIMA, Centre for Transport Studies, UCL
1 Introduction
N etwork models are used in transport studies to explorethe effects of individual travellers’ route choice. Thesemodel the likely consequences of changes in the demand
for travel, facilities provided, and ways in which demand is as-
signed. This enables planners to anticipate the response of trav-
ellers to changes and developments when investigating their ef-
fects on network performance. The outputs calculated from these
models include estimates of various costs and flows.
Here, we consider how route choice models can be formu-
lated, analysed and solved using mathematical methodologies.
This illustrates how models of traveller behaviour can be used to
anticipate response to changes and interventions, and so to sup-
port the design of systems and their use that lead to beneficial
provision and management. We examine the difference between
network performance when individual travellers choose their own
routes and when they are assigned optimally. A simple example
network is used to illustrate the effects of various management
measures.
2 Route choice and other traveller choices
2.1 Demand for travel
Personal travel arises from a need to attend at another location
in the near future. In traffic management, an objective is to de-
sign and manage transport systems so that they serve the trav-
elling public well after individuals have exercised their various
choices. Here we consider route choice during an interval short
enough that the resulting flows are approximately constant but
long enough that any transients from variation in flow are not in-
fluential. We therefore consider the demand for travel in the net-
work as a fixed flow Tod from each origin o to each destination
d, and represent the collection of these flows as T . The model
represents interactions between these different demands for travel
through network effects.
2.2 Transport networks
Transport networks in which we consider route choice include the
strategic road network of England [1, 2] – see Figure 1. Certain
points are identifiedwithin these networks to represent the origins
and destinations of journeys made from surrounding zones in the
region. Numbers of these origins and destinations increase ap-
proximately linearly with the spatial area of the region and hence
like the square of its diameter. Numbers of origin–destination
pairs available for travel increase like the product of the numbers
of origins and destinations, and hence like the fourth power of the
diameter. In a typical transport network, many origin–destination
pairs are connected by several routes, usually providing a reason-
able choice.
The network itself can be described as a set of nodes and a
set of directed links that each connect a certain pair of nodes.
Each node represents a terrestrial location, and each link repre-
sents an opportunity for travel provided by a transport corridor.
Links are defined by their start and end nodes, with various addi-
tional attributes including spatial length, travel time in free-flow
conditions and capacity, but also possibilities such as attractive-
ness and price charged.
Figure 1: Map of the strategic road network in England.
An important feature of transport networks used for personal
travel is that each link can be used by several different routes. This
can include routes that serve the same origin–destination pair,
and also routes that serve distinct origin–destination pairs, which
can lead to interaction between their respective costs of travel and
flows. Individual travellers choose routes through the network be-
tween their origin and destination, and hence contribute directly
to the route flows, but the travel conditions that they experience
depend on the total flow on the links that they use. For this reason,
models of networks require explicit representation of the flows
and costs both on routes and on links.
The relationship between link and route flows can be ex-
pressed as
v = φt (1)
where v is a vector of link flows with va the flow on link a,
∀a ∈ L, L is the set of links in the network, and φ is a binary
link-route incidence matrix with
φap =
{
1, if route p includes link a,
0, otherwise,
∀a ∈ L, ∀p ∈ Pod, ∀od.
Pod is the set of routes from origin o to destination d, ∀od, and t
is a vector of route flows with tp the flow on route p.
The analysis of zone and link numbers shows that there are
usually many more routes through a network than there are links.
In such cases, the link-route incidence matrix φ cannot have full
column rank, with the consequence that several distinct route flow
vectors can give rise to the same link flow vector. Bar Gera [3]
for example reports practical networks with over 103 trip end
zones, 104 nodes and links, 106 origin–destination pairs and 109
routes used.
2.3 Route choice modelling
To model travellers’ choices of routes, we require a princi-
ple that represents their behaviour. An important example of
this is the equilibrium principle of route choice that has been
adopted widely and analysed extensively since it was presented
by Wardrop [4] in 1952:
The journey times on all routes actually used are
equal, and less than those which would be experi-
enced by a single vehicle on any unused route. (W1)
This includes two simplifications to be recognised when inter-
preting its application. First, there is a tacit assumption that all
travellers select their routes according to the criterion of minimal
journey time: this is usually extended to a measure of generalised
cost calculated as a weighted sum of components such as travel
time, distance and price charged. The second simplification is
that all travellers are supposed to be accurately informed about
the prospective cost of travel on all available routes before they
depart.
Here we consider a model of homogeneous fully informed
travellers, which provides a basis for further development. In this
case, the equilibrium condition (W1) can be expressed as
t ≥ 0
tT .[C − θK] = 0
C − θK ≥ 0
(2)
where C is a vector of route costs, with Cp the cost of travel on
route p ∈ Pod, ∀od,K is a vector of minimum cost of travel, with
Kod the minimum cost between origin o and destination d, ∀od,
and θ is a binary matrix that identifies the origin–destination pair
served by each route:
θp od =
{
1, if p ∈ Pod,
0, otherwise,
∀od.
2.4 Cost of travel
Because travel conditions on a link depend on all the traffic that
it carries, the cost of travel along links depends on the sum of
the route flows using them. This dependence is represented as
cost function c(v), where component ca(v) represents the cost
of travel on link a, which might depend on the flows on several
links of the network. We suppose throughout that these functions
are continuously differentiable. A plausible requirement is that
the cost of travel on each link increases with the flow on that link:
∂ca
∂va
> 0, ∀a ∈ L,
in which case elements on the principal diagonal of the Jacobian
matrix J = ∇vc are strictly positive. A further requirement is
that of separability: the cost of travel on each link depends only
on the flow on that link:
∂ca
∂vb
= 0, ∀a ∈ L, ∀b ∈ L\{a},
in which case J is strictly diagonal.
These requirements can be generalised to a function c(.),
Rm → Rm, that is monotone if
[c(t)− c(s)]T .(t− s) ≥ 0 (3)
and is strictly monotone if equality arises only when t = s.
Any separable function that is (strictly) increasing is (respectively
strictly) monotone, whilst monotonicity allows for some interac-
tions between costs on some links and flows on others. Here, we
will suppose that the link cost functions are strictly monotone.
A class of functions that is widely adopted for road traffic as-
signment was proposed by the US Bureau of Public Roads [5],
which are given as a constant plus a variable component of travel
time that is a power function of flow:
ca(va) = ba + α
(
va
Qa
)β
ta, ∀a ∈ L, (4)
where ba is the travel cost when va = 0, Qa is a reference flow,
ta is the free-flow travel time, and α and β are strictly positive
parameters.
The reference flow Qa is often interpreted as the capacity of
link a, in which case αta is the increase in travel time above free-
flow when flow is equal to capacity. The parameter β controls the
increase in cost as flow increases. These parameters are often set
so that α = 0.15ba/ta and β = 4, though these can be varied to
represent different relationships and can be specified for links of
the network individually. The value β = 1 corresponds to affine
link costs that increase with flow at rate αta/Qa. These functions
are separable and strictly increasing and hence strictly monotone.
The cost of travel on routes can be calculated as the sum of
those on the links that they include. Thus
C = φT c(v) = φT c[φ(t)] (5)
where φ is the same link-route incidence matrix as is used in (1).
3 Traffic assignment
3.1 Introduction
According to Wardrop’s equilibrium principle (W1), the flows
on the routes through a network depend on the costs incurred on
them. If costs were independent of flow, then route choice would
be as well and unless there is exact equality on minimum cost
routes, all flows between each origin–destination pair would be
on a single route. However, in practice the limited capacity of the
links of a network leads to costs that depend on flows. Thus:
Route flows tp → link flows va (1)
Link flows va → link costs ca (e.g. 4)
Link costs ca → route costs Cp (5)
Route costs Cp → route flows tp (2).
This results in adjustment of route flows to balance route costs
leading to several routes being used at the same cost between each
origin–destination pair. Resolving and analysing these interac-
tions between costs and flows is the topic of traffic assignment,
which we consider here.
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signed. This enables planners to anticipate the r sponse of trav-
ellers to changes and developments when i vestigating their ef-
fects on network perfo mance. The outp ts cal u ated from these
models include estimates of various costs and flows.
Here, we consider how route choice models can be formu-
lated, analysed and solved using mathematical method logies.
This illustrates how models of traveller behaviour can be used to
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network perfo mance when individual travellers choose their own
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through network eff cts.
2.2 Transport networks
Transport networks in whic we consider route choice include the
strategic road network of England [1, 2] – see Figure 1. Certain
points are identifiedwithin these n tworks to repr sent the origins
and destinations of journeys made from surroundi g zones in the
region. Numbers of these origins and destinations increas ap-
proximately linearly with t e spatial are of the region a d hence
like the square of its diameter. Numbers of rigin–destination
pairs availab e for travel increas like the product of the numbers
of rigins and destinations, and hence like the fourth power of the
diameter. In a typical transport network, many origin–destination
pairs are connect d by several routes, usually providing a reason-
able choice.
The n twork itself can be d scribed as set of nodes and a
set of direct d links tha each onnect a certain pair of nodes.
Each node r pr sents a terr strial location, and each link repr -
sents an opportunity for travel provided by a transport corridor.
Links are d fined by their star nd end odes, with various addi-
tional attributes including spatial length, travel time in free-flow
conditions and capacity, but also p ssibilit es such as ttractive-
ness and price harged.
Figure 1: Map of the strategic road network in England.
An importan feature of transport networks u ed for personal
travel is tha each link can be used by several different routes. This
can i clude routes tha serv the same origin–destination pair,
and also r utes tha serv distinct origin–destination pairs, whic
can lead to interaction between their respective costs of travel and
flows. Individual travellers choose routes through the n twork be-
tween their o igin a d destination, and hence ontribute directly
to the route flows, but the travel conditions tha they xperi nce
depend on the total flow on the links tha they use. For this reason,
models of networks require explicit repr sentation of the flows
and costs both on routes and on li ks.
The r lationship between link and route flows can be ex-
press d as
v = φt (1)
where v is a vector f link flows with va the flow on link a,
∀a ∈ L, is the s t of links in the n twork, and φ is a binary
link-route inc dence matrix with
φap =
{
1, if route p includes link a,
0, otherwise,
∀a ∈ L, ∀p ∈ Pod, ∀od.
Pod is the s t of routes from origin o t destination d, ∀od, and t
is a vector f route flows ith tp he flow on route p.
The analysis of zone and link umbers shows tha there are
usually many more routes through a network than there are links.
In such ases, the link-route inc dence matrix φ cannot have full
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Here, we consider how route choice models can be formu-
lated, analysed and solved using mathematical methodologies.
This illustrates how models of traveller behaviour can be used to
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port the design of systems and their use that lead to beneficial
provision and management. We examine the difference between
network performance when individual travellers choose their own
routes and when they are assigned optimally. A simple example
network is used to illustrate the effects of various management
measures.
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work as a fixed flow Tod from each origin o to each destination
d, and represent the collection of these flows as T . The model
represents interactions between these different demands for travel
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2.2 Transport networks
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strategic road network of England [1, 2] – see Figure 1. Certain
points are identifiedwithin these networks to represent the origins
and destinations of journeys made from surrounding zones in the
region. Numbers of these origins and destinations increase ap-
proximately linearly with the spatial area of the region and hence
like the square of its diameter. Numbers of origin–destination
pairs available for travel increase like the product of the numbers
of origins and destinations, and hence like the fourth power of the
diameter. In a typical transport network, many origin–destination
pairs are connected by several routes, usually providing a reason-
able choice.
The network itself can be described as a set of nodes and a
set of directed links that each connect a certain pair of nodes.
Each node represents a terrestrial location, and each link repre-
sents an opportunity for travel provided by a transport corridor.
Links are defined by their start and end nodes, with various addi-
tional attributes including spatial length, travel time in free-flow
conditions and capacity, but also possibilities such as attractive-
ness and price charged.
Figure 1: Map of the strategic road network in England.
An important feature of transport networks used for personal
travel is that each link can be used by several different routes. This
can include routes that serve the same origin–destination pair,
and also routes that serve distinct origin–destination pairs, which
can lead to interaction between their respective costs of travel and
flows. Individual travellers choose routes through the network be-
tween their origin and destination, and hence contribute directly
to the route flows, but the travel conditions that they experience
depend on the total flow on the links that they use. For this reason,
models of networks require explicit representation of the flows
and costs both on routes and on links.
The relationship between link and route flows can be ex-
pressed as
v = φt (1)
where v is a vector of link flows with va the flow on link a,
∀a ∈ L, L is the set of links in the network, and φ is a binary
link-route incidence matrix with
φap =
{
1, if route p includes link a,
0, otherwise,
∀a ∈ L, ∀p ∈ Pod, ∀od.
Pod is the set of routes from origin o to destination d, ∀od, and t
is a vector of route flows with tp the flow on route p.
The analysis of zone and link numbers shows that there are
usually many more routes through a network than there are links.
In such cases, the link-route incidence matrix φ cannot have full
column rank, with the consequence that several distinct route flow
vectors can give rise to the same link flow vector. Bar Gera [3]
for example reports practical networks with over 103 trip end
zones, 104 nodes and links, 106 origin–destination pairs and 109
routes used.
2.3 Route choice modelling
To model travellers’ choices of routes, we require a princi-
ple that represents their behaviour. An important example of
this is the equilibrium principle of route choice that has been
adopted widely and analysed extensively since it was presented
by Wardrop [4] in 1952:
The journey times on all routes actually used are
equal, and less than those which would be experi-
enced by a single vehicle on any unused route. (W1)
This includes two simplifications to be recognised when inter-
preting its application. First, there is a tacit assumption that all
travellers select their routes according to the criterion of minimal
journey time: this is usually extended to a measure of generalised
cost calculated as a weighted sum of components such as travel
time, distance and price charged. The second simplification is
that all travellers are supposed to be accurately informed about
the prospective cost of travel on all available routes before they
depart.
Here we consider a model of homogeneous fully informed
travellers, which provides a basis for further development. In this
case, the equilibrium condition (W1) can be expressed as
t ≥ 0
tT .[C − θK] = 0
C − θK ≥ 0
(2)
where C is a vector of route costs, with Cp the cost of travel on
route p ∈ Pod, ∀od,K is a vector of minimum cost of travel, with
Kod the minimum cost between origin o and destination d, ∀od,
and θ is a binary matrix that identifies the origin–destination pair
served by each route:
θp od =
{
1, if p ∈ Pod,
0, otherwise,
∀od.
2.4 Cost of travel
Because travel conditions on a link depend on all the traffic that
it carries, the cost of travel along links depends on the sum of
the route flows using them. This dependence is represented as
cost function c(v), where component ca(v) represents the cost
of travel on link a, which might depend on the flows on several
links of the network. We suppose throughout that these functions
are continuously differentiable. A plausible requirement is that
the cost of travel on each link increases with the flow on that link:
∂ca
∂va
> 0, ∀a ∈ L,
in which case elements on the principal diagonal of the Jacobian
matrix J = ∇vc are strictly positive. A further requirement is
that of separability: the cost of travel on each link depends only
on the flow on that link:
∂ca
∂vb
= 0, ∀a ∈ L, ∀b ∈ L\{a},
in which case J is strictly diagonal.
These requirements can be generalised to a function c(.),
Rm → Rm, that is monotone if
[c(t)− c(s)]T .(t− s) ≥ 0 (3)
and is strictly monotone if equality arises only when t = s.
Any separable function that is (strictly) increasing is (respectively
strictly) monotone, whilst monotonicity allows for some interac-
tions between costs on some links and flows on others. Here, we
will suppose that the link cost functions are strictly monotone.
A class of functions that is widely adopted for road traffic as-
signment was proposed by the US Bureau of Public Roads [5],
which are given as a constant plus a variable component of travel
time that is a power function of flow:
ca(va) = ba + α
(
va
Qa
)β
ta, ∀a ∈ L, (4)
where ba is the travel cost when va = 0, Qa is a reference flow,
ta is the free-flow travel time, and α and β are strictly positive
parameters.
The reference flow Qa is often interpreted as the capacity of
link a, in which case αta is the increase in travel time above free-
flow when flow is equal to capacity. The parameter β controls the
increase in cost as flow increases. These parameters are often set
so that α = 0.15ba/ta and β = 4, though these can be varied to
represent different relationships and can be specified for links of
the network individually. The value β = 1 corresponds to affine
link costs that increase with flow at rate αta/Qa. These functions
are separable and strictly increasing and hence strictly monotone.
The cost of travel on routes can be calculated as the sum of
those on the links that they include. Thus
C = φT c(v) = φT c[φ(t)] (5)
where φ is the same link-route incidence matrix as is used in (1).
3 Traffic assignment
3.1 Introduction
According to Wardrop’s equilibrium principle (W1), the flows
on the routes through a network depend on the costs incurred on
them. If costs were independent of flow, then route choice would
be as well and unless there is exact equality on minimum cost
routes, all flows between each origin–destination pair would be
on a single route. However, in practice the limited capacity of the
links of a network leads to costs that depend on flows. Thus:
Route flows tp → link flows va (1)
Link flows va → link costs ca (e.g. 4)
Link costs ca → route costs Cp (5)
Route costs Cp → route flows tp (2).
This results in adjustment of route flows to balance route costs
leading to several routes being used at the same cost between each
origin–destination pair. Resolving and analysing these interac-
tions between costs and flows is the topic of traffic assignment,
which we consider here.
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3.2 Assigning the demand
For route flows t to be a feasible assignment of demand T , we
require that they are positive and sum to the required values:
t ≥ 0, and θT t = T (6)
where θ is the same route – origin–destination incidence matrix
as used in (2).
We refer to the set of feasible route flows as D ; according to
the feasibility requirements (6),D is convex, closed and bounded,
hence compact.
An equivalent expression to (2) for t∗ ∈ D to be an equilib-
rium, which we shall develop here, is
−C(t∗)T .(t− t∗) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ D , (7r)
where C(t) is the vector of route costs when the route flows are
t. This identifies whether or not an assignment is an equilibrium.
We will develop it to provide a practical test for equilibrium and
solution procedures.
Using (1) and (5) we can deduce from (7r) the link-based ex-
pression for v∗ = φt∗ to be an equilibrium:
−C(t∗)T .(t− t∗) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ D , (7r)
⇔ −c(v∗)Tφ.(t− t∗) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ D , (from 5)
⇔ −c(v∗)T .(v − v∗) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ D , (from 1), (7l)
where v = φt. This link-based variational inequality formula-
tion has the advantage of being defined in a space of dimension-
ality – number of links rather than number of routes.
This variational inequality formulation of equilibrium was
discovered by Smith [6]. It tests an assignment as a candi-
date for equilibrium by considering costs only at that assign-
ment. According to this expression, in equilibrium for each
origin–destination pair the route that
currently has least cost of travel has the
same cost as any that is used, which pro-
vides a convenient test for equilibrium
and also the basis for solution methods.
The quantity S = C(t)T .t =
c(v)T .v is the total cost incurred by as-
signment t and the corresponding link
flows v(t) provides a measure of performance of the network
with these flows. It also provides the interpretation of the condi-
tion (7) that t∗ ∈ D is an equilibrium assignment if any feasible
reassignment of traffic at current costs would increase the total
cost of travel. This will occur exactly when flow is reassigned to
a route that currently has greater cost.
3.3 Solution approaches
Procedures to calculate assignments are important for the trans-
port planning industry. The computational demand associated
with this can be substantial, so efficient methods are important.
A substantial literature has been established [3,7,8] and work on
this continues. Here, we present a simple approach that gener-
ates convergent sequences and hence establishes the existence of
equilibrium assignments as solutions to (7).
Starting from the route-based formulation (7r) of equilibrium,
we consider the programme for t ∈ D :
g(t) = max
s∈D
−C(t)T .(s− t), (8)
which is known as the gap at assignment t. Setting s = t yields 0
so g(t) ≥ 0, whilst according to condition (7r), at equilibrium
flows t = t∗ the value of the maximand in (8) is negative for all
feasible assignments s so that g(t∗) = 0 The gap g(t) therefore
provides a measure of the departure of t from equilibrium.
The solution to (8) can be calculated conveniently without
testing each feasible assignment s ∈ D . Because t is exogenous
to the programme (8), the solution is s∗ ∈ D that solves the linear
programme
min
s∈D
C(t)T .s.
This is achieved by for each origin–destination pair od assigning
all of the demand Tod to the route p ∈ Pod that minimises Cp(t):
we denote this assignment as s∗(t). Because costsC(t) are con-
tinuous in flows t, so is C(t)T .s∗(t) and hence is g(t).
At each t ∈ D we consider two cases according to the value
of g(t):
1. g(t) = 0.
The least cost of travel minp∈Pod Cp(t) for each origin–
destination pair od is no less than the current cost of travel:
t is an equilibrium.
2. g(t) > 0.
There is an origin–destination pair od for which the least
cost of travel minp∈Pod Cp(t) < Cq(t) for some q ∈ Pod
that has tq > 0 so the assignment is not in equilibrium.
By continuity of the cost functions and convexity of D ,
(s∗(t) − t) provides a feasible descent direction for the
gap. Reassigning some non-zero amount of flow from t to
s∗(t) will therefore reduce the gap.
3.4 Solution properties: existence and uniqueness
The existence of an equilibrium assignment t∗ follows from
the two cases in Section 3.3 and in particular from the descent
direction in the second case. According
to this, at any assignment t ∈ D either
g(t) = 0 so that the flows t are in equi-
librium or the gap is strictly positive and
there is a feasible descent direction. A
consequence of this is that there exists
t∗ ∈ D with g(t∗) = 0.
Uniqueness of equilibrium link
flows follows from strict monotonicity of the link cost functions.
Suppose that t∗ ∈ D is an equilibrium assignment, that t ∈ D ,
and let v∗ = φt∗ and v = φt. Then by strict monotonicity of
costs (3) if v = v∗ then
[c(v∗)− c(v)]T .(v∗ − v) > 0
⇒ −c(v)T .(v∗ − v) > c(v∗)T .(v − v∗) ≥ 0
(from (7l) because v∗ are equilibrium link flows). We conclude
that either v = v∗, or v is not an equilibrium and (t∗ − t) is a
descent direction for the gap.
A consequence of uniqueness is that if an assignment is in
equilibrium, then no different link flows can be. Because the link
costs depend on the link flows, the link costs are also uniquely
determined at equilibrium as is the total cost of travel. How-
ever, because in some cases several distinct route flows lead to
the same link flows, no corresponding uniqueness result is avail-
able for route flows.
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3.5 System optimal assignment
Wardrop’s equilibrium principle (W1) represents the behaviour
of drivers, and hence the effects of their likely response to changes
in demand for travel and the provision of travel facilities. How-
ever, according to this, route choice is influenced only by the costs
incurred by travellers themselves and not by the resulting system
performance. Wardrop recognised that an assignment that min-
imised the average (and hence, for fixed demand T , the total) cost
of travel could differ from equilibrium. He therefore stated the
system optimal principle:
The average journey time is minimised. (W2)
Evaluating system optimal assignments provides a reference for
total cost of travel against which performance of other assign-
ments can be compared. In cases where the difference is small,
the assignment can be viewed as making efficient use of the net-
work. By contrast, if the difference is substantial, traffic man-
agement measures can be developed to encourage routing that
will reduce the total costs. However, in system optimal assign-
ments some travellers will incur costs that are greater than on
other routes that are available to them, and these might exceed
costs in equilibrium.
The difference in performance between equilibrium and sys-
tem optimal assignment arises because each traveller imposes
cost on others that they do not experience themselves and hence
will not consider in making their choices. We analyse this cost ex-
ternality to calculate a link-based pricing structure that will lead
travellers to choose routes that achieve system optimality.
Let t0 ∈ D be the assignment that minimises the total cost S
in the network, i.e. that solves
min
s∈D
C(s)T .s. (9)
This differs from the solution to (8) that is used to calculate the
descent direction for gap in equilibrium assignment because in
that case, the link costs were fixed whereas in (9) they vary with
the assignment that is sought.
Provided that the gradients
d(v)T = ∇vS (10)
are strictly monotone, (9) is solved by the solution t0 ∈ D to
−d(v0)T .(v − v0) ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ D (11)
where v = φt and v0 = φt0. This corresponds to an assign-
ment from which there is no descent direction for the total cost
S. Because this formulation corresponds to (7l) for equilibrium
assignment but with d(.) in place of the link cost functions c(.),
the corresponding properties of existence, uniqueness and solu-
tion approaches obtain.
From (10) and the link-based expression for S:
d(v) = c(v) +∇vcv. (12)
The second term ∇vcv on the right-hand side of (12) that aug-
ments the costs c(v) can be interpreted as a measure of the ex-
ternal cost that traffic on each link imposes on other traffic, be
it on the same link or on others. Accordingly, if travellers re-
spected this external cost, then the resulting assignment would
be system optimal and hence would minimise the total cost of
travel in the network. Provided that travellers are homogenous
in their valuation of money, this can be achieved by charging a
price p0 = ∇vcv for use of the links of the network so that
d(v) = c(v) + p0(v).
If the cost functions c(v) are separable, according to (12)
p0a(va) = va
∂ca
∂va
. (13)
If further the cost functions c(v) have polynomial form, then
adding this price to form d(v) modifies the coefficients. In the
particular case of the power function (4)
da(va) = ba + α(1 + β)
(
va
Qa
)β
ta, ∀a ∈ L. (14)
Just as the cost functions (4) are strictly monotone so are the cor-
responding price-augmented functions (14).
4 Example calculations
4.1 Introduction
The analysis and methodology described above can be applied
to networks of any size. Here we consider assignments to a
small network that has a single origin–destination pair and only a
few routes. This will illustrate several points concerning route
choice that are highlighted by the modelling and analysis pre-
sented above.
4.2 Braess’s example network
A striking example of the difference between equilibrium and
system optimal assignments is provided by Braess’s network [9].
This network, which is shown in Figure 2, has a single origin–
destination pair with a travel demand T = 6 (measured in suitable
units). There are three routes between the origin and destination:
an upper route passing nodes (a, b, e), a crossing route (a, b, c, e),
and a lower route (a, c, e). A crucial feature of this network is that
each of the links [a, b) and [c, e) is used by two different routes,
one of which uses the central link [b, c).
o a 
b 
c 
d e 
Figure 2: Braess’s example network (see, for example, [9]).
The link-route incidence matrix φ and the parameters of the
affine link cost functions ((4) with β = 1) are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameters of Braess’s example network (β = 1).
Link a \ Incidence matrix φ
route p 1 2 3 ba αta/Qβa
[a, b) 1 1 0 0 10
[a, c) 0 0 1 50 1
[b, c) 0 1 0 10 1
[b, e) 1 0 0 50 1
[c, e) 0 1 1 0 10
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4.3 Equilibrium assignment in Braess’s network
When the assignment is t∗ = (2, 2, 2)T , the flows and costs are
as shown in Table 2. The cost on each route is 92 and there are
no unused routes so this is the unique equilibrium assignment ac-
cording to (2). The total cost of travel is S∗ = 552.
Table 2: Costs and flows on Braess’s network in equilibrium.
Route p
1 2 3
Flow t∗p 2 2 2
Cost C∗p 92 92 92
Link a Flow v∗a Cost c∗a
[a, b) 4 40
[a, c) 2 52
[b, c) 2 12
[b, e) 2 52
[c, e) 4 40
Total cost S∗ 552
4.4 System optimal assignment in Braess’s network
The system optimal assignment that solves (9) and hence min-
imises the total cost of travel S in the network can be calculated
as the equilibrium under the augmented costs d(v) (12). Because
the present cost functions are affine (β = 1), this cost augmenta-
tion doubles the coefficient of link flow, as is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Parameters of augmented costs functions d (10) for
Braess’s example network (β = 1).
Link a ba α(1 + β)ta/Qβa
[a, b) 0 20
[a, c) 50 2
[b, c) 10 2
[b, e) 50 2
[c, e) 0 20
Calculations based on the assignment t0 = (3, 0, 3)T are
given in Table 4 including the associated values D = φTd of
augmented cost d accumulated along each route and the values of
link (respectively route) cost c andC. We see that the augmented
cost on routes 1 and 3 (that each carry flow) are equal at 116 and
less than the augmented cost on route 2 that carries no flow, which
is 130. This verifies the assignment t0 as equilibrium in the aug-
mented costs d and D, so that it is the unique system optimal
assignment that solves the variational inequality (11). These link
flows and costs differ from those of equilibrium assignment t∗ as
shown in Table 2; in this case the route costs also differ.
In this system optimal assignment t0, the cost of travel on
each route that is used is 83, so that the total cost of travel in the
network is S0 = 498 < 552 = S∗. That this total cost S0 does
not exceed the total cost S∗ at equilibrium is a consequence of
the formulation of system optimal assignment as minimising S.
In order to achieve this, some travellers must incur lower costs
in system optimal assignment than in equilibrium. However, in
the present case the cost incurred by each traveller is less than in
equilibrium t∗. Because each of these assignments is uniquely
determined, the system optimal assignment cannot be an equilib-
rium: this is because the crossing route 2 (a, b, c, e) is not used
but has cost 70 that is lower than that of 83 on the routes that
are used. This violates the second part of the equilibrium condi-
tion (2) because the cost of the routes that are used is not minimal.
We therefore see that in this case all travellers will benefit if they
all use routes calculated as system optimal instead of changing to
a route that currently has lower cost.
Table 4: Costs, prices, augmented costs, and flows on
Braess’s network with system optimal assignment.
Route p
1 2 3
Flow t0p 3 0 3
Route cost C0p 83 70 83
Augmented cost D0p 116 130 116
Link a Flow v0a Cost c0a Price p0a Augmented
(13) cost d0a
[a, b) 3 30 30 60
[a, c) 3 53 3 56
[b, c) 0 10 0 10
[b, e) 3 53 3 56
[c, e) 3 30 30 60
Total cost S0 498 Revenue R0 198
4.5 Discussion: network design and pricing
Braess’s network reveals the cause of the difference between the
system optimal and the equilibrium assignments shown in Ta-
bles 4 and 2, respectively. This illuminates some issues in the
design of transport networks, and the influences that individual
choices have on network performance. A good understanding of
this is important in designing networks and managing their op-
eration because the resulting performance depends on both the
provision and management of the transport system, and on the
way in which travellers use it.
In the system optimal assignment t0, the central link [b, c)
is not used because the crossing route [a, b, c, e) carries no flow.
This route uses both of the links [a, b) and [c, e), each of which
has coefficient 10 of flow in the link cost function as shown in
Table 1: this is much greater than the coefficients 1 for the other
links. This means that each unit of flow on these two links has a
large cost externality so that variations in flow on these links will
affect the total cost of travel substantially. In the present example,
the crossing route uses both of these links so that flow on it will
generate a large cost externality twice. By comparison, the other
routes 1 and 3 use only one of the links [a, b) and [c, e), so gener-
ate the large cost externality only once. The final point is that the
cost of the central link [b, c) is low, making it candidate for part
of an attractive route: this combination of high cost externality
with low cost leads to the difference between the assignments.
We now consider this as an issue in the design of transport
networks. In Braess’s example network, although the central link
carries traffic, its closure and the consequent rerouting of traffic
would improve performance with benefit to all travellers. Con-
versely, if a network corresponded to Braess’s example but with-
out the central link [b, c), then the assignment t0 would be feasible
and an equilibrium. Adding link [b, c) would create an attractive
route, but once travellers respond to its presence, the resulting
performance would be worsened. Accordingly, there would be
no case in reduced transport cost for adding the central link.
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4.3 Equilibrium assignment in Braess’s network
When the assignment is t∗ = (2, 2, 2)T , the flows and costs are
as shown in Table 2. The cost on each route is 92 and there are
no unused routes so this is the unique equilibrium assignment ac-
cording to (2). The total cost of travel is S∗ = 552.
Table 2: Costs and flows on Braess’s network in equilibrium.
Route p
1 2 3
Flow t∗p 2 2 2
Cost C∗p 92 92 92
Link a Flow v∗a Cost c∗a
[a, b) 4 40
[a, c) 2 52
[b, c) 2 12
[b, e) 2 52
[c, e) 4 40
Total cost S∗ 552
4.4 System optimal assignment in Braess’s network
The system optimal assignment that solves (9) and hence min-
imises the total cost of travel S in the network can be calculated
as the equilibrium under the augmented costs d(v) (12). Because
the present cost functions are affine (β = 1), this cost augmenta-
tion doubles the coefficient of link flow, as is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Parameters of augmented costs functions d (10) for
Braess’s example network (β = 1).
Link a ba α(1 + β)ta/Qβa
[a, b) 0 20
[a, c) 50 2
[b, c) 10 2
[b, e) 50 2
[c, e) 0 20
Calculations based on the assignment t0 = (3, 0, 3)T are
given in Table 4 including the associated values D = φTd of
augmented cost d accumulated along each route and the values of
link (respectively route) cost c andC. We see that the augmented
cost on routes 1 and 3 (that each carry flow) are equal at 116 and
less than the augmented cost on route 2 that carries no flow, which
is 130. This verifies the assignment t0 as equilibrium in the aug-
mented costs d and D, so that it is the unique system optimal
assignment that solves the variational inequality (11). These link
flows and costs differ from those of equilibrium assignment t∗ as
shown in Table 2; in this case the route costs also differ.
In this system optimal assignment t0, the cost of travel on
each route that is used is 83, so that the total cost of travel in the
network is S0 = 498 < 552 = S∗. That this total cost S0 does
not exceed the total cost S∗ at equilibrium is a consequence of
the formulation of system optimal assignment as minimising S.
In order to achieve this, some travellers must incur lower costs
in system optimal assignment than in equilibrium. However, in
the present case the cost incurred by each traveller is less than in
equilibrium t∗. Because each of these assignments is uniquely
determined, the system optimal assignment cannot be an equilib-
rium: this is because the crossing route 2 (a, b, c, e) is not used
but has cost 70 that is lower than that of 83 on the routes that
are used. This violates the second part of the equilibrium condi-
tion (2) because the cost of the routes that are used is not minimal.
We therefore see that in this case all travellers will benefit if they
all use routes calculated as system optimal instead of changing to
a route that currently has lower cost.
Table 4: Costs, prices, augmented costs, and flows on
Braess’s network with system optimal assignment.
Route p
1 2 3
Flow t0p 3 0 3
Route cost C0p 83 70 83
Augmented cost D0p 116 130 116
Link a Flow v0a Cost c0a Price p0a Augmented
(13) cost d0a
[a, b) 3 30 30 60
[a, c) 3 53 3 56
[b, c) 0 10 0 10
[b, e) 3 53 3 56
[c, e) 3 30 30 60
Total cost S0 498 Revenue R0 198
4.5 Discussion: network design and pricing
Braess’s network reveals the cause of the difference between the
system optimal and the equilibrium assignments shown in Ta-
bles 4 and 2, respectively. This illuminates some issues in the
design of transport networks, and the influences that individual
choices have on network performance. A good understanding of
this is important in designing networks and managing their op-
eration because the resulting performance depends on both the
provision and management of the transport system, and on the
way in which travellers use it.
In the system optimal assignment t0, the central link [b, c)
is not used because the crossing route [a, b, c, e) carries no flow.
This route uses both of the links [a, b) and [c, e), each of which
has coefficient 10 of flow in the link cost function as shown in
Table 1: this is much greater than the coefficients 1 for the other
links. This means that each unit of flow on these two links has a
large cost externality so that variations in flow on these links will
affect the total cost of travel substantially. In the present example,
the crossing route uses both of these links so that flow on it will
generate a large cost externality twice. By comparison, the other
routes 1 and 3 use only one of the links [a, b) and [c, e), so gener-
ate the large cost externality only once. The final point is that the
cost of the central link [b, c) is low, making it candidate for part
of an attractive route: this combination of high cost externality
with low cost leads to the difference between the assignments.
We now consider this as an issue in the design of transport
networks. In Braess’s example network, although the central link
carries traffic, its closure and the consequent rerouting of traffic
would improve performance with benefit to all travellers. Con-
versely, if a network corresponded to Braess’s example but with-
out the central link [b, c), then the assignment t0 would be feasible
and an equilibrium. Adding link [b, c) would create an attractive
route, but once travellers respond to its presence, the resulting
performance would be worsened. Accordingly, there would be
no case in reduced transport cost for adding the central link.
If links on the network can be priced, then the matter arises of
pricing structures. In Section 3.5, the structure p0 given by (13)
was established as inducing system optimal assignment. The to-
tal revenue R collected from link prices p is R = pT .v, which
in this case amounts to R0 = 198. The revenue generated can be
used, for example, to improve the transport provision. Charging
in this way is generally considered preferable to imposing costs
through congestion and delay that result in loss of personal time
and other resources in a way that is usually unrecoverable and
unproductive.
However, this generation of revenue is incidental to the objec-
tive of system optimal assignment as can be seen by noting that
the optimal price structure is not necessarily unique. In this exam-
ple network an alternative optimal price structure is 13 (or more)
on link [b, c) and 0 on each of the others: this will induce the
same system optimal assignment t0 but will generate no revenue
because link [b, c) carries no flow. This shows that the objective of
pricing is distinct from that of revenue generation, optimal pric-
ing structures are not necessarily uniquely determined, and that a
pricing structure can be optimal without generating revenue.
5 Conclusions
Estimation of traffic flows in network is important in the transport
planning process. This involves anticipating the choices of indi-
viduals in travel using the various options that are available. The
equilibrium model of route choice can be formulated as a vari-
ational inequality. Provided that the relationships between costs
and flows on the links have appropriate mathematical properties,
a unique solution exists in link flows, and link and route costs,
though route flows will be indeterminate in some cases. The per-
formance can be calculated and compared with a system optimal
value.
This systematic approach shows that increasing traffic capac-
ity in parts of a network can lead to increased costs of travel and
hence worsened performance when travellers respond to the new
opportunities. This phenomenon arises when routes are provided
that offer relatively low cost for travellers who use them but with
relatively high external cost imposed on others in the network.
Unless travellers’ responses are considered, evaluation of trans-
port provision and traffic management will be unreliable as in
some cases this can even reverse the sign of anticipated changes
between net benefits and detriments.
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Symbols used in text (in order of appearance)
T vector of travel demands with elements Tod
from origin o to destination d
v vector of link flows with va the flow on link a, ∀a ∈ L
L set of links in the network
φ binary link-route incidence matrix:
φap =
{
1, if route p includes link a,
0, otherwise,
∀a ∈ L, ∀p ∈ Pod, ∀od.
Pod set of routes from origin o to destination d, ∀od
t vector of route flows with tp the flow on route p
C vector of route costs, with Cp the cost of travel on
route p ∈ Pod, ∀od
K vector of min. cost of travel, withKod the min. cost
between o and d, ∀od
θ binary matrix that identifies the origin–destination
pair served by each route:
θp od =
{
1, if p ∈ Pod,
0, otherwise,
∀od.
c(.) vector function of link costs with ca(.) the cost of
travel on link a, ∀a ∈ L
J Jacobian matrix of the link cost function J = ∇vc
ba = ca(0) travel cost on link a when va = 0, ∀a ∈ L
Qa reference flow for link a, ∀a ∈ L
ta free-flow travel time on link a, ∀a ∈ L
α, β parameters of the link cost functions: α > 0, β > 0
D set of all feasible route assignments
g(t) gap function at assignment t, providing a measure
of the departure of t from equilibrium
S total travel cost in network S = C(t)T .t = c(v)T .v
d(v)T grad of S with respect to link flows v : d = ∇vS
p vector of link prices, pa the price on link a, ∀a ∈ L
R total revenue from link prices p : R = pT .v
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